Polish dilemmas on the new European Union treaty by Kaczynski, Piotr Maciej
Polish Dilemmas on the New
European Union Treaty
Piotr Maciej Kaczyñski
No. 76
06/2007
snoinip
O 
& sesylan
A Analiz
y 
i o
pi
ni
e
l In June 2007 the European Council summit will decide on the
future of the EU treaty reform. The attitude of the Polish
government is that Poland will act to impede the process of
integration.
l The Polish political class varies in its attitudes towards EU
integration. The President, the government and its parliamentary
supporters back the idea of a looser integration, whereas the
opposition wants to deepen the EU structures and adopt a new
treaty as soon as possible. Both sides are accusing each other of
betraying national interests.
l Despite the internal dispute over the treaty itself, it is possible to
find a constructive and coherent position, which could gain
greater social and political support.
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Introduction
In June 2007 the European Council summit will decide on the key issues concerningthe future of EU treaty reform. The
question of reform has been on hold for the last
two years, and the process of ratifying the treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe has
halted. The summit will end the “period of
reflection and debate” and give a fresh impetus
to treaty reform, albeit in a different form, to the
Constitutional Treaty. 
Reopening the discussion of the treaty reform 
is a key issue for the German EU presidency.
Due to time constraints (the new treaty should
enter into force by 2009), Berlin prefers the new
document to be broadly similar to the version of
the Constitutional Treaty rejected by France and
the Netherlands. However, not all European
countries share this view. Polish representatives
often comment that it is more important to draft
a good treaty than to adhere to time constraints.
During the March 2007 EU summit President
Lech Kaczyñski was the only European leader to 
mention that the new treaty only has a chance of
coming into force after Poland’s presidency in
2011. Other leaders often underline that the new
treaty should already be in force by 2009, as this
date marks the election of the new European
Parliament, followed by a new Commission.
Currently (until the June summit), work on
the future treaty has been focused on
establishing the scope of negotiations at the
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). Every
government has a sovereign right to raise any
subject which it wishes to be considered at the
IGC. Subsequently, if the summit is a success
and the IGC is opened, the second stage of work
shall commence, based on agreeing on the final
wording of the document to be signed and
ratified by all member states.
The Polish Government’s Position on the EU Treaty
In the course of negotiations to date, Polish
governmental representatives have revealed
some details of Poland’s negotiating position on
the forthcoming treaty. They agreed that the new 
document should be based on the wording of the
existing Constitutional Treaty. Polish leaders
view this decision as being a concession to
Germany. Based on the existing wording,
Warsaw is making demands which have
a fundamental impact on the shape of the future
document. These include:
n Re je c tion of the “do ub le ma jo ri ty” vo ting
sy stem agre ed in the Con sti tu tio nal Treaty
n Chan ging the do ub le ma jo ri ty sy stem so
that a me m ber state’s po pu la tion is re p la ced by
its square root
n Ad ding a re fe ren ce to Europe’s Chri stian
ro ots to the pre a m b le (if the re is a pre a m b le in
the new treaty)
n Ad ding a cla u se to the body of the tre a ty
on me m ber states’ so li da ri ty in the case of an
ene r gy crisis 
n Re je c tion of the far - re a ching ex ten sion of
deci sion - ma king po wers by a qu a li fied majority
n In cre a sing me m ber states’ par lia men ta ry
in flu en ce on EU le gis la tu re by gran ting them
veto rights
n Lack of agre e ment to the ap po in t ment of
an EU Mi ni ster of Fo re ign Affairs
n Re je c tion of the Con sti tu tio nal Treaty’s
pro po sed di vi sion of po wers be twe en me m ber
sta tes and Com mu ni ty institutions
A fairly consistent concept and vision of EU
integration can be inferred from Poland’s
position, which is based on the motto of
“a Europe of nations” and is directed against
“the forced creation of a European nation”.
Consistent with this approach one can imagine
the Polish government desiring a loosely
integrated Europe, which is limited to economic
issues but without a Community-based approach 
to social, political or moral issues. To
paraphrase Polish politicians, they do not wish
to build Europe “by force”. Since Europe’s
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societies and nations are different, it makes no
sense to lead them to a common denominator.
This is the viewpoint on which Poland’s
approach to the Constitutional Treaty is based.
The Treaty is superfluous for Europe as it
contains nothing new regarding economic issues 
and attempts to deepen integration in areas
where integration is not required (for example,
foreign policy). Despite this viewpoint,
Poland’s agreement to eventually adopt the new
treaty is based on two assumptions. Firstly, since 
other EU member states are supportive of it,
there should be agreement on at least some of the 
reforms. Secondly, care should be taken that the
new treaty, which brings little good, should also
do as little harm as possible to the future
construction of the EU (for example, the new
voting system). Adding references to integration 
on areas important to Poland, such as energy
security, would be seen as added value.
Is the Government’s Approach to European Integration
Justified?
The vision of Europe outlined above, with its
sceptical approach to treaty reform, leads to
certain questions and conclusions. Firstly, is this 
– delicately speaking – cautious approach to
a united Europe justified? Secondly, does it
reflect Poland’s national interests? Thirdly, it
seems that certain inconsistencies can be
detected in Poland’s political leaders’ approach.
Fourthly, what are the possible alternative
approaches to integration? Finally, can these
different approaches be reconciled sufficiently
to secure agreement from Poland’s various
political circles, at least on a position at the
Intergovernmental Conference? If so, how can
this be achieved?
Many Polish political commentators as well
as the opposition criticise the government and
President for their inept European policy. Their
criticism focuses on two areas: the direction of
European policy and the way it is executed.
Leaving the question of (un)professional
diplomacy aside, one wonders at the differing
views held by the political parties (ruling
coalition and its opposition) on European
integration. The government supporters almost
accuse the opposition of betraying national
interests. The centre-left parties side with the
Constitutional Treaty primarily because the
document was signed by the left-wing Prime
Minister Marek Belka. The largest opposition
party, the Civic Platform, presents a more
complex approach. On the one hand, it supports
a deeper integration. On the other hand, it
seconds the government on the square root
formula. 
The deep-seated argument between the
“pro-European” camp and the government stems 
from differing views of what constitutes
national interest and what Poland is and should
be. The Law and Justice party and its coalition
partners, Jaros³aw Kaczyñski’s government and
President Lech Kaczyñski, seem to believe that
Poland’s national interests are defined by the
classic view of a nation’s power. A strong
Poland is a fully independent and wealthy state,
with a powerful army and an unwaveringly and
indivisibly sovereign civil service. Countries
such as this follow the motto of “nothing about
us without us” in their foreign policy.
There is nothing negative in such a definition
of a country and its foreign policy. Furthermore,
it is certain that no social or political movement
is against the “building of a strong Poland”.
However, one may doubt whether the way in
which the Polish government sets about
achieving this aim is the most appropriate. It is
easier to secure national interests when one has
correctly identified the surrounding context.
The theory of “undivided sovereignty” has long
since ceased to exist; European integration is
almost completely based on the principles of
divided and delegated sovereignty.
Furthermore, an analysis of the Polish
government’s positions on European integration 
issues, especially those related to the
Constitutional Treaty, leads one to assume that
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the Polish government does not understand the
European Union. It is worth mentioning three
non sequiturs at this point.
The first relates to the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). President Lech
Kaczyñski has repeatedly made sceptical
remarks on this subject, whereas Poland has
been the main beneficiary of the current form of
this policy. To begin with, some elements of the
CFSP helped to achieve a democratic
breakthrough and avoid bloodshed in 2004 in
Ukraine. All Polish politicians and
commentators agree that it is in Poland’s
interests to foster closer ties between Kiev and
the EU. Later, the efforts of all EU states and
institutions resulted in drafting a pan-European
approach to aspects of Russia’s behaviour,
which is in line with Poland’s interests:
n Suc cess in trans fer ring the bi la te ral tra de
con flict to the EU level
n Suc cess in ma king EU pa r t ners awa re of
Russia’s in ten tions of bre a king down Eu ro pe an
uni ty and ap p ly ing do ub le stan dards to wards
new member states
n Suc cess in cre a ting awa re ness of the im -
po r tan ce of ene r gy se cu ri ty among EU states
Although the meat dispute has not yet been
finally resolved, the situation clearly illustrates
the importance of “European unity”. At those
times when unity can be achieved, an
unassailable power is formed. This would imply
that Poland should support a common foreign
and security policy. Meanwhile, Poland’s
President has made several sceptical remarks on
this policy. This confusion resulted in a general
lack of understanding of the necessity for
a European army among EU states. Open
support for this solution would mean that Poland 
would back a strong common foreign policy. In
light of the President’s earlier remarks, the
European army initiative created confusion. The 
lack of follow-up on this issue by Polish
diplomats leads one to the conclusion that
remarks concerning a “European army” made by 
Poland’s politicians in autumn 2006 were at
least hasty, and could well have been a hoax.
The second non sequitur concerns the
schedule of the treaty reform. On the one hand,
Poland does not desire the new treaty to come
into effect too quickly. On the other, however, it
backs the idea of separating the discussions on
the treaty from those related to the budgetary
review, which is scheduled to commence in
2009. Linking these two issues could prove very
harmful to Poland. If negotiations on the new
treaty start to coincide with the budgetary
debate, other states will use arguments which
link these two processes (e.g. “the Constitution
in exchange for agricultural policy”). Forcing
the separation of these issues could result in
Warsaw’s use of its veto right on the one hand,
and unpleasant accusations of Poland’s
hindering the progress of negotiations on the
other. The use of the veto in the EU is often
described as an ”atomic bomb”. Therefore, if it
is frequently used, it could lead to unforeseen
and far-reaching negative consequences for
Poland.
To avoid confrontation, Poland should
appreciate the importance of reforming the
Treaty as quickly as possible. Politicians are
required to foresee several steps ahead in the
process. Therefore, both the Polish people and
EU partners are entitled to expect Polish
politicians to anticipate future events, and also
a resultant increase the predictability of,
and rationale behind, decisions which will be
made.
The third non sequitur relates to the approach
taken by Poland’s rulers to the treaty’s
preamble. On the one hand, Poland’s leaders
believe that common European values do exist.
These are primarily, although not exclusively,
Christian values. This results in Poland’s
support for the inclusion of a reference to these
values in the treaty’s preamble. On the other
hand, the Polish government believes that
integration should be limited to economic issues
and those related to the defence of member
states’ interests. The area of ethics and morals
should remain an exclusively national issue. If
this line were to be followed, the government
should require the deletion of the entire
preamble instead of expanding it with additional 
remarks. 
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A Different View of European Integration
Many commentators and opposition parties
have a completely different view of European
integration. They believe that only when Poland
is deeply rooted in European structures it can
make full use of membership opportunities.
Avaricious consumption of EU funds while
simultaneously arguing against the deepening of 
integration is not a credible approach. Similarly
unconvincing is Poland’s insistence on
solidarity among EU member states on issues
related to Poland’s interests, while remaining
silent on matters concerning other countries (an
example here could be the conflict between
Denmark and Islamic fundamentalists following 
the publication of caricatures of Mohammed –
Poland’s Foreign Minister was the only MFA to
apologise to Muslims). 
The opposition’s positive and open approach
to Europe contrasts with the suspicion and
scepticism of the ruling coalition. The Polish
people more often support the opposition’s
views than those of the government. Studies
carried out by both national research institutes
(CBOS, IPA) and the Eurobarometer indicate
that Poland is one of the nations most in favour
of European integration. The Poles favour a
different EU to that envisioned by the
government. They desire a strong, united,
deeply integrated EU, with a new treaty and
a foreign minister. What is more, they place
more faith in EU institutions than in national
ones. Poles appreciate the opportunities to
develop that the EU affords them. One can risk
the hypothesis that Poles ascribe the country’s
recent economic successes more to EU
membership than to their government’s work.
This approach signifies an amiable attitude
towards integration. In line with this belief,
deeper integration does not imply a limitation of
Poland’s sovereignty. Part of this sovereignty is
transferred to a supranational level, which
Poland can influence. It is commonly held that it
should be important for developing countries
with liberal economic policies to support the
extension of the EU mandate to new areas. These 
should include policies relating to energy,
foreign affairs, climate change, trade, migration
and other issues. Powerful EU institutions are
also in Poland’s interests. A more deeply
integrated EU would mean a larger budget, of
which Poland would shortly become the main
beneficiary. In the same vein, looser integration
could lead to more limited policies and less
funding.
Towards a Coherent Approach to the Future Treaty –
Recommendations
If EU member states can agree on the issue of
the new treaty by autumn 2009, there should be
no issues with its ratification in Poland. The
government and the Law and Justice party will
support the document that they have negotiated.
The pro-European parties (centre-left and the
Civic Platform) also will vote in favour. The
only opposition can come from the League of
Polish Families and possibly the Self-defence
party. However, before this happens, it is
important to consider what the conservative
Polish government could do to simultaneously
defend its concept of the “building of a strong
Poland” abroad and avoid the accusation that
Poland was responsible for the potential failure
of the treaty negotiations.
1. The Polish government cannot allow a situation 
in which it would be forced to veto the new
treaty. It should aim to build confidence and
convince society to agree with its arguments
while remaining open to those of others.
Neither the right of veto nor its threat should be
used by Poland. Blocking the new document
could result in the country being sidelined. It is
highly possible that a new treaty veto by
a non-Eurozone country will result in the
accelerated integration of a smaller group of
countries, without the vetoing state. This would 
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be at odds with the concept of national interest
held both by the government (“nothing about us 
without us”) and the opposition (“being at the
heart of integration”). Speaking pragmatically,
a veto cannot be exercised by a country not at
the heart of integration, since it does not have
this right.
2. The square root system is likely to be a
favourable solution for Poland, but it may
prove impossible to include in the treaty. To a
large extent, this is due to Poland’s persuasive
power being limited by its public reputation as
the “braking force” as well as a governmental
policy equally opaque abroad as it is to some
groups at home. A rejection of the double
majority voting system and a proposal to switch 
to the square root system should therefore be an 
entry point to further talks.
3. The Polish government should amend its
approach to the new treaty’s preamble in order
to appear more coherent. Supporting the
deletion of the entire preamble, backing the
removal of the word “constitution” from the
document’s title; and maintaining the stance
that the new document will be a revision treaty
(as opposed to a replacement for earlier
documents) will cause the document to lose its
political weight, which would be in line with
the concept of “being against the forced
creation of a European nation”.
4. Clauses on energy solidarity among member
states and the appropriate definition of the EU’s 
absorption capacity to allow for Ukraine’s
accession are key to deepening integration in
areas important to Poland. Wider EU
acceptance of these demands could be possible
if, for example, Poland accepts the current
voting system.
5. During treaty negotiations, the government
should maintain a flexible approach to the issue 
of widening EU decision-making authority by a 
qualified majority. In the case that this proposal 
gains widespread support among other EU
member states, Poland should not use its veto.
Careful thought should be given to the question
of where grounds can be given (for example,
voting on policing issues), and where
compromise should be sought (for example, the 
use of the so-called “supermajority”).
Transition periods and similar methods can also 
be applied. A similar approach should be taken
during talks related to the increase of national
parliaments’ influence on the EU legislative
process and the division of powers between
member states and EU institutions.
6. The appointment of a EU Minister of Foreign
Affairs remains a divisive issue in Polish
political circles. It may help to more precisely
delineate the responsibility of the minister and
the EU on the one hand, and that of member
states on the other. Explaining that the
minister’s role would not be a replacement of
member states’ foreign policies, but rather their 
complement could be valuable in gaining wider
support.
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